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Growing recognition of the Anthropocene era has led to a chorus of calls for Earth Sys-
tem Governance (ESG). Advocates argue that humanity’s newfound sociotechnical pow-
ers require institutional transformations at all scales of governance to wield these powers
with wisdom and foresight. Critics, on the other hand, fear that these initiatives embody
a technocratic impulse that aims to subject the planet to expert management without
addressing the political-economic roots of the earth system crisis. This article proposes
a more affirmative engagement with existing approaches to ESG while also building on
these critiques. While advocates of ESG typically ignore the capitalistic roots of the earth
system crisis and propose tepid reforms that risk authoritarian expressions, their critics
also have yet to systematically consider the potential for more democratic and postcap-
italist forms of ESG. In response, I propose an ecological Marxist approach based on a
structural analysis of capitalism as the primary driver of the earth system crisis and an
“ecosocialist” vision of ESG that subordinates the market to democratic planning at mul-
tiple scales. I argue that an ecological Marxist perspective is needed to foreground the
structural political-economic constraints on earth system stability, though existing ap-
proaches to ESG can in turn inform ecosocialist strategies for global institutional design
and democratization.
Planetary governance is on the theoretical (if not yet policy) agenda, catalyzed
by growing recognition of the emerging ontological condition of the “Anthro-
pocene,” in which human practices have become a force of planetary-scale trans-
formation (Crutzen and Steffen 2003). Advocates argue that humanity’s
newfound sociotechnical powers require institutional transformations at all
scales of governance to wield these powers of planetary transformation with wis-
dom and foresight (Biermann 2014; Galaz 2014; Rockström et al. 2009; Steffen
et al. 2011; Crutzen et al. 2005). The concept of “planetary boundaries” has
become particularly influential, along with the entwined project of Earth System
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Governance (ESG). These approaches posit the existence of an emergent earth
system that is more than the sum of its parts: a self-regulating entity that pos-
sesses global-scale thresholds at which continuous quantitative changes may
give way to a qualitative state shift that irreversibly transforms all its key subsys-
tems across the planet. The purpose of ESG, from this view, is to regulate the
global social-ecological systems driving planetary transformation in order to
maintain the earth system within the planetary boundaries deemed hospitable
for human development, while anticipating and warding off a state shift that
may irreversibly degrade such conditions (Biermann 2014, 21–22).
While some critical scholars within the social sciences are sympathetic to
emerging ESG initiatives (e.g., Angus 2016; Foster et al. 2011), most have
approached them with suspicion. In particular, these scholars fear that these
initiatives embody a technocratic impulse that aims to subject the planet to ex-
pert management without addressing the political-economic roots of the earth
system crisis, thereby forging a depoliticized response that entrenches existing
inequalities and risks legitimating authoritarian interventions (Lövbrand et al.
2015; Swyngedouw 2013; Baskin 2014; Mann and Wainwright 2018; Stirling
2014). In response, these critics tend to reject ESG initiatives as harbingers of
a perpetual “neoliberal” and potentially authoritarian agenda, instead affirming
the need for critical reflection and resistance from below.
This article will propose a more affirmative engagement with existing ap-
proaches to ESG while also building on these critiques. The critics are for the
most part correct that these approaches lack a sophisticated analysis of political-
economic power and focus on technocratic interventions from above that risk
legitimizing authoritarian planetary governance. In particular, the vast
majority of these approaches neglect the structure of global capitalism as the
primary driver of (and constraint on resolving) the earth system crisis, which
I will argue results in a contradiction between their stated aims of preventing
transgression of planetary boundaries and the proposed means for doing so.
However, their critics have yet to systematically consider the potential for more
egalitarian and democratic forms of ESG capable of actualizing postcapitalist
development trajectories.
In response, I will formulate an ecological Marxist approach that conceives
ESG not as a technocratic intervention from above that retains existing relations
of power and production but rather as a counterhegemonic movement of
political-economic transition beyond capitalism. This approach will involve a
structural analysis of global capitalism as the primary driver of the earth system
crisis and an “ecosocialist” vision of ESG that subordinates the global market to
democratic planning at multiple scales. I will suggest that while ecological
Marxists provide vital political-economic analysis that is lacking in existing
approaches to ESG, they are in turn limited by an underdeveloped vision of eco-
socialism that remains primarily on the level of principles while being vague on
questions of institutional design (particularly at the global scale). Therefore, by
staging an engagement between ecological Marxism and ESG, we can deepen our
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understanding of both the political-economic transformations needed to prevent
transgression of planetary boundaries and the global institutional architectures
this might entail.
I will begin with a brief overview of the planetary boundaries framework
and its corresponding ESG initiatives and will then give an overview of their
critics. Next, I will present the ecological Marxist case for why capitalism is fun-
damentally incompatible with earth system stability and why an “ecosocialist”
approach to ESG is needed instead. Next, I will pursue a synthesis between eco-
logical Marxism and ESG to address blind spots in both, which will suggest that
global institutional reforms envisioned by ESG scholars can and should be re-
thought according to ecosocialist principles. Finally, I will conclude with some
tentative speculations on how a transition to global ecosocialism might come
about, which will show that this goal is not as utopian as it might appear at first
glance.
The Incipient Earth System Governance Agenda
Environmental governance has been a staple of world politics for decades, but
what differentiates ESG initiatives from earlier forms is their more holistic rather
than sectoral approach (Biermann 2014, 16; Galaz 2014, 11). This new ap-
proach was made possible by the paradigm shift heralded by the rise of earth
system science, which can be understood, in Clive Hamilton’s words, as “the
integrative meta-science of the whole planet as a unified, complex, evolving sys-
tem beyond the sum of its parts” (Hamilton 2016, 94). In this sense, earth sys-
tem science follows in the footsteps of Gaia theory by understanding the planet
as a complex system with self-regulating properties that maintain its key param-
eters within conditions conducive to biological flourishing, though it has been
shown in geological time to periodically shift between radically altered states
(Hamilton 2016). The “Anthropocene” marks the beginning of such a state
shift, which threatens to unleash a cascade of positive feedbacks that will push
the earth system toward a “no analogue state” or one with no parallel in the
history of human evolution (Crutzen and Steffen 2003).
Hence the emerging calls for new forms of Anthropocene governance, or
“planetary stewardship,” which can be read as attempts to actualize the collec-
tive capacities to regulate humanity’s world-transforming powers to maintain
the earth system within conditions that have historically been conducive to hu-
man development. In the words of Will Steffen and colleagues,
The twenty-first century challenge is different from any other that humanity
has faced. The planetary nature of the challenge is unique, and demands a
global-scale solution that transcends national boundaries and cultural di-
vides. (Steffen et al. 2011, 749)
One of the most productive approaches developed so far for grappling with
the implications of earth system change is the planetary boundaries framework,
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which has been endorsed by the UN High-Level Panel on Global Sustainabil-
ity and embraced by NGOs like Oxfam and the World Wildlife Fund. As Johan
Rockström and colleagues explain, planetary boundaries represent judgments
on the value of key control parameters in the earth system deemed to be a
“safe” distance from dangerous levels. Whereas thresholds refer to inflection
or tipping points at which feedback mechanisms produce nonlinear transforma-
tions away from a previous state, boundaries, on the other hand, are more like
“guard rails” set a distance from these estimated thresholds, which are judged
based on an “ethical time horizon” such that political decisions could be taken
in time to avoid the threshold after a boundary is crossed (Rockström et al.
2009). Rockström and colleagues identify nine boundaries that encompass
key control variables in the earth’s biogeochemical cycles, circulation systems,
and biophysical features that contribute to the earth’s overall self-regulating ca-
pacity. These include climate change, the rate of biodiversity loss, interference
with the nitrogen and phosphorous cycles, stratospheric ozone depletion, ocean
acidification, global freshwater use, changes in land use, chemical pollution,
and atmospheric aerosol loading (Rockström et al. 2009). For each boundary,
Rockström and colleagues quantitatively estimate values at which gradual
changes may begin to accelerate through feedbacks based on historical data
on similar nonlinear changes in the past.
The planetary boundaries framework has in turn been used as one of the
primary conceptual underpinnings of the ESG project. In the words of Frank
Biermann, the ESG project studies
the sum of the formal and informal rule systems and actor networks at all
levels of human society that are set up to steer societies toward preventing,
mitigating, and adapting to environmental change and earth system trans-
formation. (Biermann 2014, 9)
This encompasses both empirical and normative ambitions, in the
sense that it investigates the emerging “architecture” of global environmental
governance—“the overarching system of inter-governmental and non-state insti-
tutions operating in a governance domain” (Biermann 2014, 12–13)—while
also prescribing institutional reforms deemed necessary to stabilize the earth sys-
tem. Biermann calls his project a “realistic utopianism,” in the sense that it en-
visions radical yet plausible global institutional transformations that would be
needed to ward off a planetary state shift. He echoes long-standing concerns
that global environmental governance overall remains weak and fragmented
(Bernstein and Brunée 2011; Kanie et al. 2012), with lack of harmonization
among multilateral environmental treaties as well as between the economic, en-
vironmental, and social pillars of “sustainable development” (Biermann 2014,
93–94). To address these weaknesses, Biermann and colleagues propose upgrad-
ing the UN Environmental Program into a World Environment Organization
(WEO) with the capacity to harmonize existing agreements and draft legally
binding treaties, creating a high-level UN Sustainable Development Council
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(SDC) that would strengthen coordination between environmental and eco-
nomic institutions and policies, and “mainstreaming” environmental goals into
global trade and financial regimes (Biermann et al. 2012a, 2012b; Biermann
2014, 141; for similar proposals, see Rockström and Klum 2015, 142, 149).
Critiques of Planetary Boundaries and Earth System
Governance Initiatives
The response to the planetary boundaries and ESG frameworks from critical so-
cial scientists has so far been predominantly marked by suspicion.1 While the
critiques are too numerous to provide an exhaustive survey, they could be
roughly summarized as critiquing what are perceived to be “postpolitical”
tendencies that (1) ignore the political-economic structures and relations of
power fueling the contemporary earth system crisis, and thereby frame the
problem as one of expert management rather than political-economic transfor-
mation, and (2) advocate potentially authoritarian governmental and geoengi-
neering solutions based on the specter of “planetary emergency.”
To start, the most common critique of ESG initiatives is that they lack an
analysis of power, inequality, and political economy and thus fail to identify
the sociopolitical roots of the earth system crisis or imagine alternative forms
of political-economic organization. As Eva Lövbrand and colleagues argue, this
impoverished social imaginary “runs the risk of producing a post-political nar-
rative that invites techno-managerial planning and expert administration at the
expense of democratic debate and contestation” (Lövbrand et al. 2015, 217). It
produces what they call a “postpolitical ontology” in which, somewhat paradox-
ically, the need for fundamental change to counter an apocalyptic threat is rec-
ognized, though it can only be countered via the very same institutions that
have created the problem in the first place (Lövbrand et al. 2015, 212). Eric
Swyngedouw similarly contends that these approaches reduce the politics of en-
vironmental change to scientific consensus and consensual policy making,
which marginalizes conflicting perspectives and visions for alternative political-
economic worlds. It is thus recognized that “we have to change radically, but
within the contours of the existing state of the situation… so that nothing really
has to change” (Swyngedouw 2013, 4). In this way, deeper analyses of the
1. It is worth noting here that the ESG research agenda is internally diverse and stems from
multiple disciplinary backgrounds. Critics typically focus on ESG and initiatives coming from
natural scientists because these initiatives tend to ignore or simplify questions of political-
economic power and inequality, while approaches like those of Biermann and Galaz have
come under comparatively less scrutiny. Though they have different academic origins and
don’t all share the same set of policy prescriptions, I believe it is useful to include them all
under the ESG umbrella, because they are all engaged in a common project of envisioning
new global institutions to regulate human–nature relations on a planetary scale. Further-
more, they are united by a common earth system framework (including the terminology
of planetary boundaries and thresholds), often share strikingly similar proposals for global
institutional reform (Biermann 2014, 141; Rockström and Klum 2015, 142, 149), and are
similarly quiescent on the political-economic roots of the earth system crisis.
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problem are marginalized, and the underlying political-economic architecture of
planetary crisis is repackaged as the “solution.”
Second, critics of ESG initiatives fear not only that they feed into a para-
doxical defense of the neoliberal status quo but also that they may promote
more authoritarian interventions that use the specter of “planetary emergency”
to cement new forms of hierarchical rule. Melissa Leach, for example, argues
that the planetary boundaries framework “leads all too easily to new forms of
environmental authoritarianism,” since it aligns with “top-down approaches”
that ignore political questions of justice, resource access, and the need for dee-
per transformations (Leach 2014). Jeremy Baskin similarly argues that calls for
Anthropocene governance legitimate the “the need for exceptional rule and au-
thoritarian responses,” which emphasize the role of expert-based management
reliant on technological innovation and geoengineering (Baskin 2014, 13). Geoff
Mann and Joel Wainwright contend that these initiatives are pushing toward the
creation of what they call “Climate Leviathan,” or a planetary sovereign with the
capacity to “seize command, declare an emergency, and bring order to the Earth,
all in the name of saving life” (Mann and Wainwright 2018, 31). For them this
would entail a world government with binding technical authority on scientific
issues, a panopticon-like capacity to monitor and intervene within the planet’s
biogeochemical flows, and the rights to engage in geoengineering experiments
and more generally to decide which populations and ways of life must live and
which must be sacrificed for the good of biospheric life (Mann and Wainwright
2018, 30, 150). Thus, while many critics focus on the ostensibly “neoliberal”
character of incipient ESG initiatives, others fear that they will actualize even
greater authoritarian potential as the unfolding earth system crisis intensifies
calls for emergency governance.
Toward an Alternative ESG Agenda
The critiques enumerated above undoubtedly illuminate problematic tenden-
cies within the emerging literature on planetary boundaries and ESG, though
they also tend to be based on strawman portraits of these approaches. For
one, many ESG advocates are clearly aware of the need for far-reaching institu-
tional transformations rather than incremental market-based reforms (e.g., Steffen
et al. 2011, 13; Rockström and Klum 2015, 153). Second, many (if not most)
of them are also highly critical of both the plausibility and desirability of tech-
nological and geoengineering solutions, instead advocating rapid decarboni-
zation schemes and a just distribution of planetary resources (e.g., Steffen and
Smith 2013; Biermann 2014, 28). Third, while there are certainly technocratic
tendencies among many (if not most) ESG proponents, many also emphasize
the need for new forms of democratic accountability, as well as a pluralistic
approach to knowledge that doesn’t fetishize scientific expertise, to ward off
the authoritarian dangers discussed by their critics (e.g., Crutzen et al. 2005;
Biermann 2014, 134).
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However, as the critics show, it remains true that these approaches lack an
adequate political-economic analysis of the roots of the contemporary earth sys-
tem crisis or a vision of ESG that clearly breaks from these roots. For example,
Johan Rockström and Mathias Klum emphasize the need for going “beyond
GDP” to define new criteria for growth and progress (Rockström and Klum
2015, 142), yet they stop short of confronting the relations of political-economic
power that reinforce the imperative of GDP growth. More problematically, they
refuse to think beyond the “growth imperative” itself, instead believing that
growth can instead be “decoupled” from environmental impact through expo-
nential technologies, resource efficiency, and circular economicmodels (Rockström
and Klum 2015, 133). Thus the solutions they offer remain handicapped by
their reticence to challenge the core relations of power and structural impera-
tives of the global capitalist economy, instead putting faith in decoupling (a
dangerous bet, as I’ll discuss below) and ignoring the massive redistributions
of wealth and ownership needed to institute an “equitable sharing of remaining
biophysical space” (Rockström and Klum 2015, 142).
Relatedly, Biermann and colleagues call for useful global governance re-
forms that constitute steps in the right direction, though they don’t address
the political-economic roots of the present crisis by advocating a deep transfor-
mation of the organizing principles of the global economy, let alone a shift be-
yond capitalist social relations. They recognize that “global sustainability cannot
be achieved without fundamental reforms in the global economic system,”
though they are ambiguous on what this means beyond “mainstreaming” envi-
ronmental goals into the activities of global economic institutions and develop-
ing “multilaterally harmonized systems that allow for discriminating between
products on the basis of production processes” (Biermann et al. 2012b, 53).
Such moves might constitute genuine steps toward sustainability, yet they ignore
the degree to which global institutions like the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), World Bank, and World Trade Organization (WTO) would need to be
radically transformed if such policies were to provide any significant check on
(let alone reversal of ) market-driven development priorities. Biermann’s own
work goes further in proposing the creation of a WEO with the capacity to draft
treaties and counterbalance the WTO’s investor dispute settlement mechanism,
and his call for “global citizen assemblies” adds a much-needed mechanism for
democratizing ESG (Biermann 2014, 99–100, 141). However, without more far-
reaching transformations of the relations of power that drive the dynamics of
global capitalism, Biermann’s proposed WEO may be more likely to give birth
to the sort of Climate Leviathan feared by Mann and Wainwright—one that
does little to address existing inequalities and only mildly counterbalances
the untrammeled rule of global capital (Mann and Wainwright 2018), whereas
global citizen assemblies would likely be ineffectual unless accompanied by
deeper restraints on capitalist power.
In short, despite increasing recognition of the need for deep structural re-
forms of the global economy, scholars of ESG remain reluctant to extend their
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gaze beyond capitalist horizons, even as those horizons appear increasingly in-
adequate. The critics of ESG therefore make vital interventions to politicize and
deepen these debates. However, they have to this point remained critical rather
than constructive and have also yet to systematically consider the potential for
more egalitarian and postcapitalist approaches to ESG.2 The reluctance to pro-
pose alternative visions of ESG is likely due to the perception that the earth sys-
tem perspective is inherently depoliticizing and technocratic, since it ostensibly
subsumes all local specificity and multiplicity within a totalizing vantage point
from which the earth and human societies can be controlled (e.g., Stirling 2014;
Baskin 2014). However, this view simultaneously downplays the need for global-
scale institutional regulation to rapidly transform global production systems
(not to mention constrain the power of global capital) and exaggerates the tech-
nocratic impetus of the earth system perspective, which (at least in certain
expressions) is less concerned with centralized control than with attunement
to emergent global patterns and thresholds,multiscalar interactions, and the limits
of human knowledge (Crutzen et al. 2005). In short, the earth system sciences
alert us to the need to think holistically about our planetary life-support
systems and to develop modes of political-economic analysis, struggle, and
governance that are adequate to the scale of the problems we face, though this
should not obviate the need for analysis, struggle, and creative autonomy at
multiple scales (e.g., according to the principle of “subsidiarity”). In this sense,
rather than downplaying the need for new forms of global governance or merely
advocating local and pluralistic forms of resistance (e.g., Stirling 2014; Mann
and Wainwright 2018), we can show that the insights of earth system science
demonstrate the need for a postcapitalist project of ESG based on a structural
analysis of global capitalism and a vision of political-economic and global
institutional transformation that would break from these constraints. To develop
the foundations of this approach, I turn now to ecological Marxism.
Ecological Marxism, the Structural Unsustainability of Capitalism, and
the Imperative of Ecosocialism
The field of ecological Marxism has grown over the past three decades as
scholars in the historical materialist tradition have rediscovered the ecological
dimensions of Marx’s thought, which were occluded by the “productivist” lean-
ings of Marxist-Leninism in the early twentieth century (Foster 2000). While the
field is itself diverse, with sometimes fractious debates between those favoring a
“methodologically dualist” approach to nature-society relations (Foster et al.
2011; Malm 2018) and those promoting a more “hybridist” approach (Moore
2. This has also been the case in the field of global environmental politics, where even more
critically minded GEP scholars stop short of systematically addressing the potential for post-
capitalist forms of global environmental governance, despite recognizing the (possibly fatal)
constraints imposed by global capitalism (e.g., Paterson 2000; Newell and Paterson 2010;
Dauvergne 2018; Stevenson and Dryzek 2014).
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2015; Smith 2008), they are united by a shared critique of the structural unsus-
tainability of capitalist socioecological relations and emphasis on the need for
an “ecosocialist” transition to resolve the earth system crisis in a socially just
manner.
Ecological Marxism builds on Marx’s concept of the “metabolic rift,”
which refers to the “material estrangement of human beings within capitalist
society from the natural conditions which formed the basis for their existence,”
thereby disrupting the biogeochemical cycles through which ecological systems
are reproduced (Foster 2000, 163). While metabolic rifts are not specific to cap-
italism, capitalism is nonetheless unique due to the particular system of “value”
that drives its historical dynamics of expansion, crisis, and renewal. Simply stated,
capitalism is a mode of production organized by the imperative of accumulating
and circulating exchange-value rather than use-value; rather than producing
with an eye toward the satisfaction of immediate needs, capitalism as a system
organizes production for the purpose of creating commodities to be sold on the
market for a profit, while the profits are then reinvested in production in an ever-
expanding circuit (Foster et al. 2011, 39). Under the hegemony of exchange-
value relations, which creates an emergent structure often referred to as the
“law of value,” producers are forced to orient the scale and intensity of produc-
tion in accordance with market signals rather than natural rhythms, thereby cre-
ating a “rift” between production and ecological reproduction (Foster 2000,
164). Rather than being a sign of an ecologically deficient market system that
simply needs to price ecosystem services more effectively, for ecological Marxists,
this rift between production and ecological reproduction is a central feature of
how capitalism has actually worked historically and which has enabled its dyna-
mism and profitability. In the words of Jason Moore, “the great secret and great
accomplishment of capitalist civilization has been to not pay its bills. … To
call for capitalism to pay its way is to call for the abolition of capitalism”
(Moore 2015, 87, 145).
The capitalist law of value creates not only selection pressures to external-
ize costs but also a structural reliance on continuous compound growth. Under
constant pressure from the discipline of market competition, firms are structur-
ally incentivized to reinvest their profits in productivity-enhancing innovations,
new products, and finding new markets, while those that subordinate profit
maximization to alternative goals risk being driven out of the market (Smith
2016, 15). While many view growth as an “ideology” or “fetish” that could
be done away with while keeping capitalist social relations intact (e.g., Daly
1996), most economists agree with Schumpeter’s view that “stationary capi-
talism is a contradiction in terms” (quoted in Tanuro 2014, 74). After all, a con-
dition of low or no growth is a condition of “crisis” within a capitalist system,
which leads to a reinforcing cycle of slowing investment, rising unemployment,
weakened demand, and political instability (Smith 2016, 47). For the same rea-
sons, capitalism cannot exist without rampant consumerism, which is not simply
a bug but rather a fundamental feature that has been critical to its continuous
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reproduction since the ascent of advertising in the post–World War II world
(Foster et al. 2011, 379–380). Humanity thus finds itself in a double bind
under capitalism, as starkly articulated by Richard Smith: “insatiable growth
and consumption are destroying the planet and will doom humanity in the
long run—but without ceaselessly growing production and insatiably rising
consumption, we would have economic collapse in the short run” (Smith
2016, 23).
To escape this predicament, mainstream environmentalists (including
planetary scientists like Johan Rockström) argue that growth can be “decoupled”
from ecological impact via efficiency improvements and “green” technologies
(Rockström and Klum 2015, 133). However, multiple studies demonstrate that
decoupling is an illusion (made clear by focusing on the global economy as a
whole instead of individual nation-states) and that efficiency improvements of-
ten lead to an increase in environmental impact by lowering costs and raising
demand (the “rebound effect”) (Wiedmann et al. 2015; Kallis and Hickel
2019). Some may point out that decoupling economic growth at least from
CO2 emissions appears achievable, since the global economy has grown faster than
CO2 emissions in recent years (Figueres 2017). However, this ignores both rising
methane emissions (driven largely by the conversion from coal to natural gas
plants) (Howarth 2019) and the fact that the estimated reductions likely needed
to prevent 1.5°C of warming (7% annually, reaching net zero by 2050) are well
beyond what current models estimate would be feasible in a context of com-
pound growth (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2018, 15; Kallis
and Hickel 2019). Thus even mainstream economists like Anil Markandya
acknowledge that reducing emissions 50 percent by 2050, thereby stabilizing
atmospheric CO2 concentrations around 550 parts per million (PPM), is likely
the “lowest credible target” in a context of continuous economic growth
(Markandya 2009, 1145). Even though Rockström and colleagues estimate
that 450 PPM constitutes the upper end of a likely threshold of runaway
climate change (Rockström et al. 2009), Markandya notes that “no one seriously
believes this [450ppm] is possible” (Markandya2009, 1145). Similarly,DavidVictor
claims that “even a realistic crash program to cut emissions will blow through
2 degrees; 1.5 degrees is ridiculous” (Victor 2015).
Given mounting evidence that positive feedbacks in the earth system—
including arctic ice loss, Amazon and boreal forest dieback, and permafrost carbon
and methane release—may be activated at 1.5°C and especially 2°C (Lenton
et al. 2019), these economists appear to be accepting catastrophic climate change
as the necessary cost of capitalist survival. And if we include other planetary
boundaries that may have already been overshot—including biodiversity loss,
land conversion, and nitrogen/phosphorous loading—the prospect of genuine
solutions to the earth system crisis in a context of compound growth recedes ever
further into implausibility, given that these boundaries are primarily stressed by
global market pressures for agricultural intensification, commercial expansion
into formerly intact ecosystems, megainfrastructural development, and resulting
46 • Capitalism and Earth System Governance
fragmentation of habitats (Kallis 2018, 100). It should thus be clear that any pro-
gram of ESG that does not involve a system-wide assault on and eventual nega-
tion of the capitalist law of value, one that goes far beyond “mainstreaming”
environmental goals into global trade, investment, and finance regimes (Biermann
et al. 2012a, 1307) (which themselves rely on and exist to perpetuate continuous
compound growth), would be radically insufficient.
A genuine solution, then, to the earth system crisis cannot lie within a cap-
italist system, no matter what global institutions are grafted onto it, but requires
a transition toward “ecosocialism.” As Ian Angus explains, ecosocialism
will be based on collective ownership of the means of production, and it will
work actively to eliminate exploitation, profit, and accumulation as the driv-
ing forces of our economy.… [It] will imply the limitation of growth and the
transformation of needs by a profound shift away from quantitative and
toward qualitative economic criteria. (Angus 2016, 202–203)
Whereas earlier forms of socialism followed capitalism’s industrial model
of development (due in large part due to the imperatives of competition and
survival within a global capitalist system) and were responsible for comparable
environmental horrors, eco-socialists revive the ecological dimensions of histor-
ical materialism to rethink socialism as the “rational regulation of human–nature
relations by the associated producers in line with their needs and those of future
generations” (Foster et al. 2011, 59–69). In practice, this would subordinate
global markets to democratic planning to reorient production systems and en-
terprises away from profit maximization toward sustainably meeting basic
needs (Baer 2018, 132). For example, Angus envisions “a democratically created
and legally binding global plan” that would govern the transition to renewables
and phase out wasteful industries (e.g., arms production, advertising, factory
farming, and wasteful consumer goods) (Angus 2016, 191). Richard Smith sim-
ilarly calls for “a comprehensive global plan, a number of national or regional
plans, and a multitude of local plans—and we need to coordinate them all”
(Smith 2016, 147). Most ecosocialists agree that such a plan must coordinate
a transition to a “steady-state economy” in which the consumption of energy
and raw materials remains constant, though this would need to be preceded
by “managed degrowth” in the Global North to secure development space for
populations in the Global South—a process of “contraction and convergence”
(Smith 2016, 114; Tanuro 2014, 72; Wallis 2018, 79–80; Kallis 2018, 154).
Synthesizing Earth System Governance and Ecological Marxism
While ecological Marxism provides much-needed analysis of the structural
political-economic constraints on genuine planetary stewardship, I do not claim
that they have all the answers. Rather, they have much to learn from contempo-
rary scholars of ESG regarding the problems of global institutional design and
democratization. Thus, by combining ESG and ecological Marxism, we can
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develop a framework for ecosocialist ESG that would simultaneously be more
capable of preventing transgression of planetary boundaries and constraining
the authoritarian dangers perceived by ESG critics.
First, the ESG literature offers more concrete proposals that can help eco-
logical Marxists think through the problems of institutional design in a global
ecosocialist system. In particular, advocates of global planning like Richard
Smith and Ian Angus have yet to consider how such plans could be democrat-
ically designed and implemented on a global scale, and ESG scholars can help
Marxists on this front. For example, proposals for a WEO to harmonize UN en-
vironmental programs and agreements (Biermann 2014, 74–75) and a UN SDC
to integrate economic and environmental agencies (Biermann 2014, 102–103;
Bernstein and Brunée 2011; Kanie et al. 2012) should be considered by ecolog-
ical Marxists and others envisioning ways to supplant neoliberalized global in-
stitutions. More ambitiously, we should consider how these organizations could
enable a global forum for democratic deliberation on crucial questions of
economic-environmental planning—for example, those regarding the use of
risky technologies like nuclear power and biotechnology, the sharing and distri-
bution of “remaining biophysical space” (Rockström and Klum 2015, 142), and
the level of risk populations are willing to accept vis-à-vis different planetary
boundaries.
Building on these proposals, we could envision a global architecture of
nested planning authorities at multiple scales that make use of market mecha-
nisms while subordinating them to democratically determined ends,3 thereby
institutionalizing the dominance of use-value considerations over exchange-value.
At the highest scale would be a reformed and empowered UN in which economic
and environmental organs are integrated under a UN SDC, which would form an
umbrella organization with the aim of setting, monitoring the progress of, and
coordinating sectoral policies and programs to meet the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals (SDGs) (modified to exclude the goal of GDP growth) (Biermann
2014, 103; Hickel 2018).4 A WEO would be created to coordinate the multitude
of environmental agreements on climate change, biodiversity, land use, and
ocean governance, while the WTO, IMF, and World Bank would be transformed
beyond recognition to design policies for trade, finance, and investment that are
3. The precise relationship between planning and markets in an ecosocialist system is complex,
though many ecosocialists agree that markets have an important coordinating role to play so
long as they are constrained by a dominant public sector, nationalization of large firms, and
the abolition (or at least radical transformation) of labor markets (Baer 2018, 132–136).
4. This vision of a UN Sustainable Development Council is more ambitious than the proposal
described by Biermann, since it would constitute an umbrella organization that hierarchically
constrains lower-level agencies rather than simply an independent organization that issues rec-
ommendations. It may thus be closer to the “umbrella organization for sustainable develop-
ment” described by Bernstein and Brunée, though some proposals for a Sustainable
Development Council take this form as well (see Bernstein and Brunée 2011, 33, 35).
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in line with agreements established by the WEO and SDC.5 The latter would in
this way form something akin to a global planning agency that ensures coher-
ence between economic and environmental policies to meet the SDGs, whose
key tasks would include setting limits on global material-energetic throughput,
distributing emissions and other resource allowances according to historic in-
equalities and urgent developmental needs, restructuring trade relations to relo-
calize economies where possible and ensure ecologically efficient trade where
necessary, and supplanting GDP with alternative metrics for measuring eco-
nomic health and well-being. This would ideally involve a global agreement
for equitably sharing the world’s remaining carbon, land, nitrogen, phospho-
rous, and freshwater budgets, as Rockström and Klum suggest (Rockström and
Klum 2015, 142), though this would require drastic and imminent carbon
emissions reductions and other consumption cuts in the Global North well
beyond rates that would be compatible with compound economic growth
(perhaps requiring 40–50% reductions in their biophysical footprints, accord-
ing to Jason Hickel, 2018). It would also create “multilaterally harmonized sys-
tems that allow for discriminating between products on the basis of production
processes,” as Biermann and colleagues advocate (Biermann et al. 2012b, 53),
though it would go well beyond market mechanisms like carbon pricing to in-
volve democratic input on which technologies and production policies should
be prioritized, which should be abolished, and when and where certain forms of
trade should be allowed or curtailed.
More radically, transnational firms above a certain size would be
nationalized—especially those in the fossil fuel, agribusiness, and financial
sectors, which is needed to catalyze a rapid transition to renewable energy and
carbon sequestering agroecology—but tightly regulated national and regional-
scale markets composed of small and medium-sized firms would be allowed
(Baer 2018, 132). New forms of democratized ownership of public utilities
and businesses would not only be an end in themselves but may be necessary
to enlist the support of working-class populations for the transition (Smith
2016, 140) and should thereby be encouraged and incentivized. Perfect “contrac-
tion and convergence” may be unrealistic, though such an ideal can at least be
approached through moderate downscaling of production and consumption
in the Global North combined with direct aid, technology transfers, and debt
cancellation. But at least equally important as redistribution between rich and
poor countries will be redistribution of resources from wasteful sectors of the
economy (e.g., arms production, advertising, and luxuries), which would be
gradually phased out, to the “caring” sectors aimed at sustainably meeting basic
needs (Wallis 2018, 51).
5. As Walden Bello argues, this will at the very least require globally coordinated regulations to
restrict capital mobility, close tax havens, set up a global fiat currency as reserve currency to
replace the US dollar, and channel investment into socially and ecologically regenerative pro-
jects (Bello 2019, 260–261).
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Second, the emerging literature on ESG can help ecological Marxists grap-
ple with the problem of how to balance between the potentially competing dic-
tates of ecological sustainability and democratization. This arguably constitutes
the most difficult “governance puzzle” facing ESG initiatives (Galaz 2014, 34),
one that cannot be pushed away simply through nebulous appeals to “demo-
cratic planning.” After all, critics of ESG may be understandably wary of calls for
a UN SDC to coordinate global planning and set limits on material energy
throughput, and there is no guarantee that ecosocialism would be able to avoid
authoritarian expressions (Mann and Wainwright 2018, 38). While trade-offs
may to some extent be unavoidable, Biermann and Galaz suggest that “polycen-
tric” governance can attenuate tendencies toward centralized control (Biermann
2014, 24–25; Galaz 2014, 62). In this model, states, cities, and local communi-
ties would retain decision-making control over the means of pursuing their de-
velopment priorities (following the principle of “subsidiarity”), though these
would need to be constrained by global plans for limiting material-energetic
throughput and redistributing resources. Thus there may be risks that scientists,
who would play a crucial role in defining the “safe operating space” within
which global development unfolds, would acquire unchecked power in such
a formation. However, the legitimacy and feasibility of such plans would be
largely contingent on democratic mobilization from below to force govern-
ments to adopt pledges in line with SDC agreements. Furthermore, as Biermann
suggests, deliberative global citizen assemblies, composed of individuals ran-
domly selected across the global population, could be empowered to shape eco-
nomic planning priorities, determine the level of risk populations are willing to
accept, and debate policy alternatives within the SDC (Biermann 2014, 141).
John Dryzek and Hayley Stevenson show that real-world examples of delibera-
tive assembles—seen for example in the United Kingdom’s 2007 Climate
Change Citizens’ Summit, the 2009 World Wide Views project, and the Alberta
Climate Dialogue in Canada—usually agree to follow more precautionary prin-
ciples and adopt stronger mitigation policies than their governments, demon-
strating that democratization need not come at the expense of sustainability
(Stevenson and Dryzek 2014, 18–19, 183). To make these models of delibera-
tive planning more viable at the global scale, new forms of “crowdsourcing” that
take advantage of digital technology could facilitate discussion and input from
citizens around the world, similar to the way crowdsourcing processes were used
to gather input for formulating the SDGs (Gellers 2016). In this way, a global
plan to determine hard caps on the “risk threshold” populations are willing to
tolerate vis-à-vis different planetary boundaries, distribute remaining biophysi-
cal space, and prioritize certain trajectories of technoscientific research and de-
velopment could be arrived at through a dialectic of scientific expertise and
democratic engagement.
However, risks will inevitably remain, in particular the risk that indige-
nous and other underprivileged groups will continue to be marginalized while
inequalities persist, which will require continuous vigilance and struggle to
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ensure democratic accountability and inclusion. But the risks should not obviate
the importance of working toward more egalitarian and democratic forms of
ESG; if anything, they should enhance the urgency of systematically thinking
through its possible contours, challenges, and strategies for addressing them.
As Hans Baer emphasizes, the point is not to design a perfect utopia but rather
to make “the best possible world within existing constraints,” which will con-
tinue to pose its own problems and demand new struggles (Baer 2018, 2).
Sheer Utopianism? The Problem of Transition
Those who I critique for failing to go beyond capitalist horizons may very well
agree with the desirability of something like the ecosocialist ESG sketched
herein, though they might argue that it is simply too remote and utopian of
a prospect to merit serious scholarly investigation. From this view, the moderate
reforms proposed by scholars like Biermann and Rockström may be the best we
can hope for, while the urgency of the climate crisis calls for solutions that could
be implemented under capitalist constraints. This is an understandable concern,
and it is therefore necessary to move from “abstract” to “concrete” utopianism
by providing a plausible scenario for an evolutionary transition to ecosocialism
(Kallis 2018, 125). In this way, it is possible to show that the prospect of eco-
socialism may be less utopian than many believe, though it would most likely
need to be preceded by systemic reforms (e.g., a “Green New Deal”; GND) to
begin immediately reducing emissions and buy time for a more far-reaching
postcapitalist transformation.
To start, it is necessary to emphasize that global capitalism faces not only
an earth system crisis but also a structural political-economic crisis—a contextual
condition that has been ignored by ESG scholars—that will in turn be exacer-
bated by the intensifying earth system crisis. This structural crisis (often de-
scribed as “secular stagnation” by mainstream economists) is driven by a
combination of diminishing outlets for profitable productive investment, un-
precedented inequality, and stagnant wages that limit effective demand while
relying on credit-fueled consumerism, the depletion of “conventional” or
easy-to-access oil, and the funneling of accumulated surpluses into financial
speculation instead of production (Wolf 2014; Bello 2019; Robinson 2014;
Moore 2015). Global growth remains precariously reliant on historically low
interest rates and burgeoning corporate and household debt (with total global
debt reaching 318% of GDP in 2018) (Oguh and Tanzi 2019), and the IMF
warns that easy credit has “encouraged more financial risk-taking and a further
buildup of financial vulnerabilities” (International Monetary Fund 2019, viii).
Many economists across the spectrum therefore believe that the underlying
weaknesses that contributed to the 2007–2008 financial crisis have yet to be
resolved, leaving global capitalism stuck in an unsustainable growth trajectory
that will be punctured by subsequent crises (Wolf 2014; Bello 2019).
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When we consider how capitalist stagnation and financial systemic risk
will converge with intensifying climate impacts, it becomes clear that global eco-
nomic turmoil in the coming years is very likely, and it is even possible that
capitalism may be facing an “irreversible decline in [its] capacity to restructure
its way out of great crises” (Moore 2015, 27). In this context, initiatives for sys-
tem change will be able to garner widespread appeal and enhance their agency.
But this would not in itself, of course, enable the emergence of ecosocialism. It
is likely that anything like ecosocialist ESG would need to be preceded by a
global GND, or a globally coordinated response to economic and ecological cri-
ses that combines state-led investment in “green” technologies with massive job
creation and infrastructure programs (Lawrence 2019). However, it is possible
that a GND would succeed neither in sustaining “healthy” growth rates—given
the potentially debilitating consequences of possible energy constraints,6 in-
creasing public debt, and “internalizing” ecological costs for an already precar-
ious and over-indebted global economy (Moore 2015, 145)—nor in catalyzing
the rapid emissions reductions needed to meet the 1.5°–2°C target (let alone
preventing transgression of other planetary boundaries). In a context of persis-
tent low growth (particularly if promises of abundant “green jobs” turn out to
be oversold7), worsening climate impacts, and evidence that even a global GND
is unable to reduce emissions with the necessary speed, a strong enough net-
work of socioecological movements across the globe might succeed in pushing
governments to radicalize the GND in the direction of planning, contraction of
wasteful consumerism (especially in the Global North), and radical redistribu-
tion as a substitute for economic growth.
Of course, there are many ifs here. It is possible that a global GND would
generate a sustainable trajectory of inclusive “green growth” and climate stabi-
lization, as Newell and Paterson envision in their “Climate Keynesianism” sce-
nario (Newell and Paterson 2010, 172–173). More likely, persistent stagnation
and crisis in a global GND regime may precipitate nationalist backlash and re-
version to “growth at all costs” (“green” or otherwise), leading to ecological
breakdown and conflicts over dwindling resources. Nonetheless, it is plausible,
as William Robinson contends, that something like ecosocialism could “snow-
ball out of efforts to bring about a reform of the [global capitalist] system”
(Robinson 2014, 233). But rather than unfolding naturally from the socioeco-
logical contradictions of a global GND, it could only emerge through counter-
hegemonic struggle at multiple scales. The question of how counterhegemonic
6. This will be contingent on future technological advance, though studies suggest there will be
less energy available to the global economy as it transitions to renewable energy. This is pri-
marily due to the limited “energy return on investment” of renewables once full life cycle costs
of mining, transporting, and constructing renewable energy grids and battery systems are taken
into account (Kallis 2018, 80–81).
7. Optimistic assessments of “green job” creation typically focus solely on net gains within the
energy sector, which may downplay the massive disruptions that would be triggered by de-
carbonizing the rest of the economy—from manufacturing and petrochemicals to aviation
and shipping (Smith 2016, 112).
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movements will simultaneously be able to overcome entrenched capitalist resis-
tance and right-wing reaction is a difficult one, and, given the current balance of
class and social forces, this is admittedly not the most probable outcome. Yet
the combination of capitalist stagnation, intensifying earth system crisis, grow-
ing discontent with capitalism and increasing support for socialism in core
states (particularly in the United States and United Kingdom),8 and strengthen-
ing movements for climate justice shows that the preconditions for such a tran-
sition may be coming into place. And as Nafeez Ahmed suggests, “by 2030, and
even more so by 2050—as the manifestations of global capitalism’s self-
catabolic trajectory become more obvious—it will appear increasingly realistic”
(Ahmed 2017, 91). It is thus necessary to develop postcapitalist visions that may
capture collective imagination and inspire transformative action as the crises of
global capitalism and the earth system create windows of opportunity for sys-
tem transformation, rather than focusing solely on short-term reforms that will
almost certainly be inadequate for addressing these crises.
Conclusions
In this article, I have argued for an ecological Marxist approach to rethinking
ESG, one that addresses the blind spots identified by critics while contributing
toward a more transformative alternative. It agrees with Biermann and col-
leagues that we need a “roadmap for institutional change” that can achieve
the “fundamental reform of sustainability governance” required to prevent
transgression of planetary boundaries (Biermann et al. 2012b, 52), though it
suggests that such discussions need to expand their horizons by considering
postcapitalist approaches. Marxist perspectives are needed to foreground the
structural political-economic constraints on earth system stability, though exist-
ing approaches to ESG can in turn inform Marxist strategies for global institu-
tional design and democratization.
As we plunge deeper into an era of profound disruption to business-as-
usual, one likely comparable to the mid-twentieth-century crises that gave birth
to the UN system (Kanie et al. 2012), it is important that scholars grapple with
the range of political-economic and global governmental transformations that
may emerge, while envisioning and evaluating strategies for enabling more
egalitarian and democratic transition scenarios. The field of global environmen-
tal politics has much to offer such discussions, and it is my hope that more
scholars will go beyond description and critique of existing governance arrange-
ments to contribute toward a collective project of ESG that adequately grasps
8. Recent polls show that 40 percent of Americans (and 60 percent under the age of thirty years)
claim to prefer socialism to capitalism (Younis 2019). And in the United Kingdom, the Labour
Party has adopted a radical GND proposal—which includes nationalizing the largest energy
companies, expanding universal basic services, repealing anti–trade union laws, and transfer-
ring resources to the Global South—thereby moving itself closer toward ecosocialist principles
(Saltmarsh 2019).
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the deep transformations needed to stabilize and heal the earth system, while
also furthering the ends of environmental justice.
Michael J. Albert is a doctoral candidate in political science at the Johns Hopkins
University. His PhD thesis investigates the convergence of earth system, political-
economic, energy, and food crises to anticipate how world order may transform
in the coming decades. He also has a forthcoming article in Global Policy: Next
Generation titled “The Dangers of Decoupling: Earth System Crisis and the
‘Fourth Industrial Revolution.’”
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